Geopolitical Tensions Flare as International Incidents Spotlight Shifting Power Dynamics

Ali Gündoğar
7 min readJul 28, 2024

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The world stage is currently witnessing a series of seemingly disparate, yet interconnected incidents. Escalating violence in the Middle East, geopolitical jockeying for position in Ukraine, ongoing espionage battles between China and the West, and political intrigue in Russia and its “near abroad,” have attracted headlines. But their potential long-term implications for global power dynamics merit closer scrutiny.

Middle East Tinderbox as Israel Responds to Attacks

In the Middle East, Iran is continuing its long-standing support of its allies against its primary regional nemesis, Israel. From rocket attacks against its border in the occupied Golan Heights, which Tel Aviv has illegally occupied for almost sixty years, to drone strikes against its largest city, Tel Aviv, Iran has used its proxies, Hezbollah and the Houthi militia to take its war against Israel to a new level.

This is against a backdrop of heightened tension following an almost 10-month conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, which has left more than 39,000 Palestinians dead and thousands of Israelis wounded.

The Nuclear Option

Adding more complexity to the mix is Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Despite the Obama-Biden administration’s recent return to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and despite the best diplomatic efforts of the UAE and Oman, Israeli and Western intelligence analysts believe that Tehran is pursuing the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. There have also been rumors of Russian intelligence intervention and cooperation, providing Moscow with crucial support on sanctions avoidance tactics.

Washington’s Hands Tied Amid Political Uncertainty

The Biden administration has, somewhat predictably, condemned Iran’s actions while insisting that Washington and the NATO alliance do not seek a war with Tehran. However, following the unprecedented cyberattacks in August that disrupted power supplies to New York, and amid Biden’s dropping out of the presidential race, Washington is in no position to make decisive pronouncements, let alone to take action on this front.

Washington’s policy objectives include a political settlement to the war between Israel and Hamas. While the US and Israel are reportedly getting closer to a ceasefire deal with Hamas that might lead to the release of hostages, this remains complicated and depends in no small measure on a shift in the posture of Iran’s Pasdaran, the Guardians of the Revolution who, in tandem with their allies, have no particular desire to see the hostilities brought to an end.

Meanwhile, there are concerns that the Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, might take a radically different approach if elected in November. Trump, whose pronouncements on foreign policy are unpredictable, has, nonetheless, consistently signaled his close ties to, and willingness to work with, both the Israeli government as well as Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) — and is hostile towards Iran.

French Diplomacy Falters amid Syrian Tensions

Caught in an escalating regional power-struggle that pits Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf monarchies against their shared rival, Iran and its allies, Syria, French diplomacy faces tough obstacles. Following an audacious and surprisingly successful initiative on its part to re-establish relations with Syria after its decade-long boycott — and despite its failure to save its most strategic Middle Eastern contract in recent decades for the supply of Rafale fighters to Abu Dhabi — the government in Paris has made clear its intentions to renew its involvement in the region.

But France has alienated many of its would-be partners and supporters by its continued, albeit mostly discreet, support for Kurdish separatists and groups active in northeast Syria (whose regional oil ambitions are clashing increasingly with those of Turkey and Iran), and its diplomatic attempts to reach out to Syria to secure more business have recently been scuttled by a number of missteps, both in its relations with the Syrian president and in overestimating the eagerness of Gulf States — in particular Saudi Arabia — to join any plan wherein France has a role, particularly as an arms broker to Syria and Lebanon.

Ukraine: “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Russia?”

The conflict on Ukraine, with Western fears in recent months of a second, massive Russian offensive and of Belarus being pulled into the war as a formal combatant on Russia’s behalf, has not abated. Russia’s continued offensives on the Ukrainian frontline — particularly using its highly prized Iskander ballistic missiles in double strikes against military infrastructure, then later against personnel responding to these, have taken their toll, not the least on Western foreign fighter morale, while Putin is strengthening ties with countries supplying drones, including from Iran and possibly also North Korea.

However, Kyiv has stepped up the pressure with long-range strikes and drone attacks deep in the Russian homeland — one drone hit a key strategic bomber base, while another, travelling over 1,100 miles, destroyed an oil facility and killed at least 15 civilians, and Western governments have responded to the risks incurred in supplying Ukraine with materiel. Germany will train hundreds of specialists for a new Polish-based center to oversee the receipt of more weapons from Western allies, while the UK is developing a dedicated “cyber bridge” for rapid delivery of tactical military intelligence, a critical necessity when sending troops to fight behind the lines.

Ukraine has also taken a more proactive diplomatic approach, meeting regularly with EU officials, but also with political leaders in those states, like Hungary, which have not given them unqualified support. It is possible Kyiv will eventually look to the Vatican as a potential partner in mediating peace talks, while Ukraine, with U.S. support, is pressing on its drive to ensure closer legal and regulatory frameworks on Russia, its allies and financiers at bodies like FATF and ICSID.

US’s Shadowy “Disruptive Technology Strike Force” at Forefront of Tech Wars

Cyber attacks from China and Russia continue to disrupt US networks and assets in the West as both governments bolster their capacities in new technology. These have drawn a raft of counter-offensive and defensive measures, notably through the Justice Department’s crackdown on industrial espionage, while a task force on the theft of trade secrets was established by President Biden in February 2023 to increase his options.

At the forefront of the battle in countering these attacks, both domestic and international, is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s discreetly run Disruptive Technology Strike Force (DTSF). Established in February 2023 as part of Biden’s China policy in its ambition to stop its adversaries gaining access to strategically critical new technology such as semiconductors, quantum computing and artificial intelligence, the DTSF brought together members from multiple US government agencies and from the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre to conduct coordinated operations.

In addition to imposing harsher criminal penalties for those breaking US regulations, Washington is pressing for a multilateral legal and intelligence response that includes a rethink of how sanctions are managed as part of “enhanced coordination and better information-sharing with like-minded allies” — to prevent loopholes for adversaries.

Meanwhile, Western companies and especially intelligence community contractors in China are getting increasingly edgy, as several have been struck off the business register in recent months, and a number of firms have announced plans to evacuate most of their remaining non-local personnel to relocate in friendly Hong Kong or other offshore centres.

Conclusion

It seems improbable that these separate incidents are anything other than temporary hiccups on the ever evolving world stage.

What is for certain is these incidents reveal the fragility of both regional and global security arrangements, and signal shifting power dynamics in the geopolitical world. Their effects on strategic and industrial competition will reverberate well beyond 2024, and their impact should not be underestimated.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. What is the connection between Russia’s war in Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas?

Russia and Israel are both at war, with its adversaries, Ukraine and Hamas respectively, actively supported and equipped by both Iran and its allies. With its political and military apparatus now overstretched in Ukraine, Russia seeks the backing of those hostile to Israel to take pressure off its own front by launching diversionary assaults in areas of strategic interest to Israel, thereby distracting attention while increasing costs on a rival, the United States.

2. Will France ever successfully resume its long-standing role as a diplomatic interlocutor in the Middle East?

French leaders hope so. They believe they have a role in both mediating disputes and promoting closer relations between states through cultural diplomacy, energy and investment, and arms contracts. However, its previous diplomatic and financial ambitions in Syria and the Gulf have been undermined by its support for the Kurds, and a certain amount of French political hubris, assuming others would welcome France taking up a key role in the region.

3. Will China continue to pursue a non-confrontational approach on global flash points?

Probably, if it can be done without sacrificing national security objectives, in order to strengthen its political and economic standing. This was on view recently when Xi Jinping had several long phone calls with Joe Biden, wherein they reaffirmed their mutual desire to avoid war and military escalation between both countries despite deep mutual mistrust. The US and its allies still regard China’s economic dominance as a security threat, while Beijing continues to increase its rhetoric on the unfair nature of Washington’s world view, and its efforts to “build and support a coalition to undermine and contain China’s growth and influence.”

4. Will business as usual continue for corporate intelligence firms operating in China?

It seems unlikely in the longer term. They have suffered increasingly hostile measures since at least 2016. With Chinese President Xi Jinping taking a more nationalistic approach to strategic sectors, and despite attempts by many of these companies to ensure better cultural harmony by hiring Chinese senior staff and redefining company branding, it is difficult to see how these firms can operate freely in China.

5. Will 2024 bring lasting change to the intelligence community?

Only if Biden wins. A number of significant new policy initiatives are on the table that will significantly enhance the budget and scope of U.S. intelligence activities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. A win by the Republicans, with an unknown and uncertain foreign policy that could roll back these programmes and undo much of the restructuring that is already underway, would be the most damaging outcome for the intelligence community.

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